Case Study: Perrier Water Company
After the New York Times announced on Feb.
. 10, 1990 (seven days after benzene was found) that production had been halted worldwide, stocks dropped from 1,692 francs a share to 1,490 franks a share, then again to 1,413 francs a share after the Times announced that Japan also removed Peppier from shelves. Peppier was a victim to Its own reputation and hardly acknowledged the event. The company tried to minimize consequences in an inconsistent manner, while expelling too many excuses and causing controversy. Peppier didn’t try to restore reputation or positive perception.
D They did not properly apply communication, external relationship tasks and monitoring, and acted in a reactive manner due to panic. 0 Production began again in March, but reputation and perception was slow to garner positive status.
Intel Recall ) Problem 0 Intel spent much time winning over the public with the “Intel Inside” campaign, but failed to keep the public happy when they failed to announce that their series of Pentium chips released in 1993 was flawed (they said that the chip wouldn’t affect average home use, but it would). 0 Intel thought since they had the facts on their side, that was all that they needed, and made no move to reinstate positive perception until too late.
) Key Strategy 0 Initially, Intel was very defensive and reactive, claiming that the problem was so minor, it would only affect computer ululations once In every 27,000 days, when Instead It was every 24 days. In the long run, Intel issued a too-late apology to quell criticism. They also offered new chips after receiving complaints. 0 Eventually, Intel set up twice daily meetings to update and fix the crisis. They set up a hotlist, and issued published apologies. They also brought in third party experts to back up facts.
3) Result 0 Intel incurred a huge loss of $475 million. D Stock and net Income fell only a small amount.
CLC CEO Andrew Grove wrote a KICK called only ten Paranoia service auto consumers Dealing UT first. 0 When Intel stated that they would replace chips (instilling trust), stocks went up from $3 to $61 a share. Mantel Recall 1) Problem 0 In 2007, Mantel voluntarily recalled approximately 9 million toys due to loose magnets and lead paint. With the holiday season approaching, Mantel was faced with the huge challenge of maintaining the trust of its vendors, consumers, and stakeholders as well as Chinese and American governments, all while simultaneously reviewing their outsourcing, product manufacturing and testing procedures.
The customers, while extremely important, were put before employees – no internal communication. 0 Danger to children because of the lead caused a huge problem. Relationships with licensed partner companies, employees and shareholders are all in Jeopardy. 2) Key Strategy Apology to Chinese caused controversy. Mantel had to balance their interest in maintaining good business relations with China and their commitment to corporate responsibility.
Mantel receives 65 percent of its toys from China and has significant investments in the country.
While Mantel’s apology was necessary to help mend elation’s with China, they were then criticized by some in congress. Mantel must determine how they can continue to outsource to China while rebuilding trust in their product with consumers. 0 Strategy: to tell the truth, prove it with action, listen to the customer and manage for tomorrow. 3) Result 0 Mantel has an opportunity to lessen distrust and rumors in future situations by establishing revolving communication with its various publics. 0 Congress is currently holding Chinese imports under increased scrutiny.
Bridgetown/Firestone Recall 1) Problem 0 In 1998, State Farm Insurance researcher advised the NATHAN that he had found 20 cases of tread failure associated with Firestone tires dating back to 1992. No action resulted. In January 2000,Houston television station CHOU aired a story on tread-separation accidents in Texas. Afterwards, many people called the station to relate their own stories of Firestone tire failures, most on them on Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicles. These were relayed to Joan Cloakroom, former chief of the NATHAN.
Finally, Sean Kane, a former employee of the
Center for Auto Safety and the founder of Strategic Safety, a research organization, also tried to alert the NATHAN about problems with tread separations on Firestone tires. After learning about similar problems in Venezuela, Strategic Safety, together with Public Citizen, another consumer watchdog group, issued a press release on August 1 asking Ford for a vehicle recall. 0 NATHAN was slow to respond. In March 2000, investigators found 22 tread-separation complaints that they marked for “initial evaluation. ” The number of complaints skyrocketed between March and May, and by
May 2, the NATHAN elevated their status to “preliminary investigation.
” Days later, the NATHAN requested that Bridgetown/Firestone supply production data and complaint files, which it produced on July 27. 0 Within days, investigation included 46 possible deaths and on August 9, Firestone/Bridgetown issued recall of 6. 5 million tires. 0 The company refused to expand recall to other tires outlined as dangerous in Manta’s investigation. Also, news surfaced that Bridgetown/Firestone had known about the problems silence AY, Ana Tale to alert ten puddle.