Public Goods Games
When a public good game is played with punishment, it creates numerous strategies in the players. This leads to the formation of a coalition is some players and communication is enabled. The cooperation is usually formed between people who are usually strangers.
This aspect is usually studied in sciences and economics. In a research carried out by Hannelore Brandt, she tried to decipher the relation of public game and the cooperation diverse people form (Brandt, 2003, p. 1). The study used three individuals to study out the possibilities of cooperation and interaction. The author writes that there is a possibility that territoriality promotes cooperative behavior.
This is the case of prisoners. In addition, the punishment that is formed usually brings out a sense of responsibility. The researcher presumes that, when there is an action of three people who are socially oppressed, then they have to devise ways and means of coming out with good results. If there is a will to punish, there is always formation of cooperation. This reduces the results of exploitation. Thus, the individuals in the game become more and more cooperative.
In the research, the author reviews the book of public goods by Binmore and ultimatum game. She concludes that there is always an altruistic, cooperative mode. It is created after players in a game decide to form cooperation due to either fear or lack of option. The author writes that there is a possibility that people can be made to collaborate through either rewards or punishment. The case example is when she takes three players and decides to play a game of possibilities using various variations. She takes three sample players and does not introduce the punishment, but when the punishment is introduced, the results are as follows: after there is an introduction of punishment, there is the possibility that the players will start to be keener in each subsequent round (Offerman, 1997, p.
697). This is because the punishment is usually very costly since the fee of punishment must be paid and the actual fines. Therefore, the author concludes that punishment is usually an unselfish behavior. In addition, it increases the contributions by the players. It in return leads to cooperation amongst them. In the experiment, she concludes that human beings form a pronounced nature of punishing offenders.
The readiness to punish usually increases with the rate that the offenders commit crime. It also remains after there is a stop by the agents to commit a crime. The defectors are the ones who determine the rate of punishment. For a case of simplification, the researcher decides that there, it is best to employ the use of binary options. The players decide after every round, to punish or not to punish the perpetrators.
To punish these players, the agent who punishes involves a cost labeled g on the offender. For people who have done the mistake, the cost reflects as b for each one of them. This in return leads to four basic strategies for three groups (Kosfeld, 2006, p. 127).